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THE TAXABILITY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES:
GLASS CUTS MACOMBER STRAIT-JACKET
Neither the Constitution nor subsequent statutes define what is
to constitute income within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amend-
ment.1 Thus any solution to the problem must be gathered from
court decisions.
At an early date the Supreme Court defined income as "the
gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined"
provided it be understood to include profits gained through a sale
or conversion of a capital asset.2 Many fact situations have arisen
since the Eisner v. Macomber decision in which courts have
chosen to depart from the narrow definition of income attributed
to that case.8 In recent cases4 involving the taxability of punitive
damages, the Supreme Court has allowed another departure from
the judicial strait-jacket of the Macomber case.
Summary of the Cases in Question
In General American Investors C6. v. Commissioner5 the court
of appeals held that sums paid-over to a corporation in compli-
ance with section 16 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act6 consti-
tuted taxable income to the corporation. Though sustaining the
holding of the Tax Court that the sums represented taxable in-
come to the corporation, the court of appeals rejected the exer-
cise in semantics in the course of which the Tax Court stated that
I U. S. CONST. AMEND. XVI. See also 1 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
§ 5.01 (1942) and CAIRNS, A Note on Legal Definitions, 36 COL. L. REV. 1099, 1102
(1936).
2 Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189 (1920) ; Stratton's Independence, Ltd. v. How-
bert, 231 U. S. 399 (1913).
8 1 MERTENS, op. cit. supra note 1, § 5.04; Note, Apparent Abandonment of a Defini-
tive Concept of Income, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1072 (1932).
4 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Glenshaw Glass Company and William Gold.
man Theatres, Inc., 99 L. Ed. 361 (1955) ; General American Investors Co. v. Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue, 99 L. Ed. 366 (1955).
5 211 F. 2d 522 (2nd Cir. 1954).
815 U. S. C. A.§78p. (b).
[Vol. 9
COMMENT
such sums were "profits" because section 16(b) provided that
"any profits realized shall inure to and be recoverable by the
issuer." The court of appeals bluntly stated that the payments
involved were not profits to the corporation. Thus it appears clear
that the court of appeals rejected the narrow definitive system of
the Macomber case as to what constitutes taxable income; and the
decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court.
The other cases to be considered involved the question of
whether punitive damages awarded under federal anti-trust laws
constitute taxable income to the recipient. In Commissioner v.
Glenshaw Glass Co.7 the court of appeals concluded that punitive
damages were not within the scope of the definition of taxable
income found in Eisner v. Macomber. The court of appeals dis-
tinguished the General American Investors case on the ground
that the cases were factually different. The court preferred to
draw an analogy to cases in which contributions made by a sov-
ereign in the general public interest to an individual were held
not to constitute taxable income. The analogy apparently drawn
was that such taxpayers have recovered because the sovereign
has seen fit to punish certain behavior for the good of the public
which was considered to be the same theory underlying the award
of damages for violation of federal anti-trust laws. The court
likened exactions by the sovereign to donations made to one in-
dividual by the state by operation of law. A similar result was
reached by the court of appeals in Commissioner v. William
Goldman Theatres Inc.,' which involved a similar question of the
taxability of treble damages recovered for violations of federal
anti-trust laws. However, the court of appeals for the seventh
circuit in Commissioner v. Obear-Nester Glass Co.9 reached a
contrary result to that of the Glenshaw and Goldman cases though
faced with a similar fact situation. Being unable to reconcile the
taxability of "insiders profits" with the non-taxability of punitive
damages, the court concluded that the authorities were in con-
flict and followed the authority holding such amounts received
7 211 F. 2d 928 (3rd Cir. 1954).
8 211 F. 2d 928 (3rd Cir. 1954).
9 217 F. 2d 56 (7th Cir. 1954).
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as damages under the federal anti-trust statutes to constitute tax-
able income.
Upon appeal to the Supreme Court, the Glenshaw and Gold-
man cases were reversed.'" The Court held that there had been an
undeniable accession to wealth, clearly realized, and over which
the taxpayers had complete domination. Of great significance was
the limitation placed by the Court on the often quoted definition
of taxable income contained in Eisner v. Macomber. It was stated
that the definition was to be limited in its application to the ques-
tion before the Court in that case; viz, distribution of a corpo-
rate stock dividend.
Many questions are raised by these decisions. Are the courts
going to abandon the definitive system of determining what con-
stitutes taxable income? If so, what guide posts are to be used in
determining whether the matter under scrutiny constitutes taxable
income? Have the decisions shifted the emphasis toward the eco-
nomic concept of income? What effect will the decisions have
on the administration of the Federal Anti-trust statutes?
To better equip ourselves to analyze the decisions, briefly let
us consider the development of the theories with respect to the
taxability of damages since the now famous Eisner v. Macomber
decision.
Taxability of Damages in General
The primary test used by the courts in determining whether
a certain item of damages is taxable or not appears to be: "in
lieu of what were the damages awarded?"" By applying such a
test, it has been concluded that damages which compensate for
damage to reputation or which represent a replacement of lost
capital or impairment of capital are not taxable. 2 The cases and
administrative rulings rest on the theory that the thing in lieu of
10 Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co. and William Goldman Theatres, Inc., supra
note 4.
11 Raytheon Production Corp. v. Commissioner, 144 F. 2d 110, 113 (lst Cir. 1944),
cert. denied, 323 U. S. 779 (1944); Note, The Taxability of Punitive Damages, 101
U. of Pa. L. Rev. 1052 (1953).
12 Durkee v. Commissioner, 162 F. 2d 184 (6th Cir. 1947) ; Arcadia Refining Co. v.
Commissioner, 118 F. 2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1941) ; Highland Farms Corp. v. Commissioner
42 B.T.A. 1314 (1940) ; Hawkins v. Commissioner, 6 B.T.A. 1023 (1927). See 1 MERTENS,
op. cit. supra note 1, § § 521 and 522.
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which the damages were awarded was not taxable income; i.e.,
the damages merely made the injured party whole, no item of
profit or gain being included in the measure of damages."
However, this is not to say that all damages recovered are to
be excluded from gross income. If the damages represent a reim-
bursement for lost profits1" or for services rendered, 5 the pre-
viously mentioned test is met and the damages are deemed tax-
able income. Similar results are reached if the damages are for
expenditures under a contract entered into for profit 6 or damages
for loss of property in excess of the cost of the property. 7
An area in which controversy existed is that of subsidies. Where
a government pays a subsidy, a distinction has been drawn be.
tween compensation for reduced operating revenues on the one
hand,"8 and compensation for construction expenses on the other. 9
In the typical situation in which chambers of commerce and sim-
ilar organizations make contributions to induce new industries
to settle in their districts, such contributions have been held not
to be income.2"
From the discussion above, it can be seen that the rules appli-
cable to other types of damage awards do not provide a basis for
determining whether punitive damages are taxable income. Be-
cause of the very nature of punitive damages the "in lieu of"
test cannot be used. Also, the rules applied in the subsidy cases
13 Sol. Op. 132, I-1 CuM. BULL. 92 (1922) ; I. T. 1852, 11-2 CUM. BULL. 66 (1923).
14 United States v. Safety Heating & Lighting Co., 297 U. S. 88 (1936) ; Swastika Oil
and Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 123 F. 2d 382 (6th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 317 U. S. 639
(1942); Commissioner v. Woods Machine Co., 57 F. 2d 635 (lst Cir.), cert. denied,
287 U. S. 613 (1932) ; Nichol v. U. S., 48 F. Supp. 662 (Ct. Cl. 1943) ; Nicholas W.
Mathey, 10 T. C. 1099, afl'd. 177 F. 2d 259 (lst Cir. 1949).
15 Buffalo Union Furnace Co. v. Commissioner, 23 B.T.A. 439 (1931) ; Blease v. Com.
missioner, 16 B.T.A. 972 (1929).
16 Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U. S. 359 (1931).
17 Helvering v. William Flaccus Oak Leather Co., 313 U. S. 247 (1941) ; Raytheon
Production Corp. v. Commissioner, 144 F. 2d 110, (1st Cir. 1944).
is Texas and Pacific Ry. Co. v. U. S., 286 U. S. 285 (1932) ; Continental Tie & Lumber
Co. v. U. S., 286 U. S. 290 (1930) ; Baboquivari Cattle Co. v. Commissioner, 135 F. 2d
114 (9th Cir. 1943) ; Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., 42 B.T.A. 1395, aTd. 126 F. 2d 725
(5th Cir. 1942) ; for general discussion of subsidy payments see MERarNS, Op. cit. supra
note 1, § 5.14 and MAGILL, TAXABLE INCOME p. 385 (1945).
19 Edwards v. Cuba R.R. Co., 268 U. S. 628 (1925).
20 Brown Shoe Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, 339 U. S. 583 (1950) ; Frank Holton &
Co., 10 B.T.A. 1317; GCM 16952, CB 1937-1; MAGILL, op. cit. supra note 18, at 392;
MEaRTENS, op. cit. supra note 1, § 5.14.
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are of no aid in the solution of the problem. Therefore let us turn
to the rules that have developed in cases involving punitive
damages.
Rules as to Taxability of Punitive Damages
Since 1940, the Tax Court has held that punitive damages are
not income, while the commissioner has continued to tax them
as such.21 There are two foundation cases for the Tax Court's
view. The Tax Court's position was originally based on Central
Ry. Co. of New Jersey v. Commissioner,22 in which it was held
that a recovery by the taxpayer from one of its former officers
who had surreptitously created a corporation with operations
adverse to the taxpayer's interest was not taxable income. In
reversing the Board of Tax Appeals, the circuit court stated that
the property received could not be traced to a "gain derived from
capital, from labor, or from both combined," nor could it be said
to be a gain from a sale of a capital asset. The recovery was
deemed to be a "windfall" or a "penalty imposed by law on a
faithless fiduciary, a gain granted gratuitously because of the
necessity of keeping persons in positions of trust beyond the
temptations of double dealing."
The second foundation case, Highland Farms Corp. v. Com-
missioner,'3 was the first case to deal specifically with the taxa-
bility of punitive damages. Though the Central Railway case was
cited, the opinion of the Board of Tax Appeals that punitive dam-
ages were not taxable income was not based on the theory that
such sums were "windfalls" but rather that the sums did not
come within the definitive test of Eisner v. Macomber.
With the law in such a state the courts were presented with the
Glenshaw and Obernester cases previously discussed. But during
the same period Park & Tilford Distillers Corp. v. U. S.24 and the
21 The first case to rule specifically on the taxability of punitive damages was High-
land Farms Corp. v. Commissioner, 42 B.T.A. 1314 (1940). The Commissioner published
his nonacquiescence in 1941 - 1 CuM. BULL. 16, and has maintained his position. See 2
Cum. BULL. 71; I-1 CUm. BULL. 92, 93; VII-2 Cum. BULL. 123; 1954.1 Cum. BU. 179,
180.
22 79 F. 2d 697 (3rd Cir. 1935).
23 42 B.T.A. 1314 (1940).
24 107 F. Supp. 941 (Ct. Cl. 1952) cert. denied.
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General American Investors cases were establishing another doc-
trine. In the Park & Tilford case, the Court of Claims held "in-
siders profits" recovered by the taxpayer pursuant to section
16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to be taxable in-
come. The court was unwilling to surmise that the Supreme Court
by their language in Eisner v. Macomber intended to read-out of
the income tax statute language which Congress had inserted
with great deliberation and for important reasons, viz, "income
derived from any source whatever." Faced with a similar prob-
lem, the Tax Court reached the same result in General American
Investors but based their conclusion on different grounds.
Therefore, the stage was arranged for the entrance of the Su-
preme Court into the drama in the following manner: the Glen-
shaw, Highland Farms, and Central Ry. Co., cases, joined by
the Goldman case, had established authority for the proposition
that punitive damages were not within the purview of Eisner v.
Macomber and were not taxable income; but, the Park & Tilford
and General American Investors cases, joined later by the Ober-
nester Glass Co. case, constituted authority for holding punitive
damages to be taxable income. With the stage thus set, the Su-
preme Court, because of the frequent recurrence of the question
and the differing interpretations by the lower courts, granted cer-
tiorari in the Glenshaw Glass, Goldman Theatres and General
American Investors cases. The Court held the sums involved con-
stituted taxable income on the basis that a liberal construction
must be given to the broad phraseology of section 22(a) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 193925 and that the language of Eisner
v. Macomber was never intended "to provide a touchstone to all
future gross income questions.2"
Soundness of the Supreme Court Decisions
In truth, all that can be done by way of definition is to chart
the course of growth of the income tax law. In the Macomber
25 INT. REv. CoDn of 1954, § 61 is the successor to § 22 (a) of the 1939 Code and the
slight language changes have not affected its all inclusive nature. H.R. Rep. No. 1337,
83rd Cong. 2nd Sess. 168; S. Rep. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 168.
26 Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co. and Goldman Theatres, Inc., 99 L. Ed. 361
(Advance Sheet No. 9, 1955).
27 MERTFWS, op. cit. supra note 1, § 5.03 at 163.
1955]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
case, the Supreme Court attempted a definition of income that
was to serve as a guiding principle for the future.28 Such an at-
tempt was destined to failure. It is apparent that "constitution-
ally taxable income" is not a term that can be successfully defined
so as to be binding for all time. The law of income taxation, like
constitutional law in general, is dynamic, not static. It must con-
stantly change and develop to meet the changes in the economic
and political life, to say nothing of meeting the ingenius devices
for tax avoidance devised by brilliant tax attorneys. In abandon-
ing the definitive system of solving the problem of what is income,
the Court is registering its approval of Mr. Justice Holmes' re-
mark "We see nothing to be gained by the discussion of judicial
definitions."2 Thus from the viewpoint of legal practicality the
decisions seem to be sound.
Furthermore, it is difficult to believe that the Supreme Court
intended that a narrow construction be placed on the sweeping
terms of Section 22a as a result of their decision in Eisner v.
Macomber."0 Except as the particular revenue statutes may "ex-
empt" income from tax or "postpone" its recognition, it may
be assumed that Congress intended to embrance within the scope
of the tax all income which it might constitutionally tax.81 In
fact, the Supreme Court has frequently stated that the language
of Section 22a was used by Congress to exert "the full measure
of its taxing power."8 2 Such decisions demonstrate that the catch-
all provision of Section 22a, "gains or profits and income derived
from any source whatever," was never intended to be confined
within narrow limits by a case that dealt only with the taxability
of stock dividends.
There is still another legal theory which will serve as a strong
foundation for the decisions. It has been stated that the meaning
of the word "income" is that given it in common speech and
28 MTENS, op. cit. supra note 1, § 5.03 at 160.
29 Mr. Justice Holmes, in U. S. v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U. S. 1 (1931).
30 Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U. S. 461 (1940) ; U. S. v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U. S. 1
(1931).
31 Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331 (1940) ; Helvering v. Midland Mutual Life
Insurance Co., 300 U. S. 216 (1937) ; Douglas v. Willcutts, 296 U. S. 1 (1935) ; Irwin
v. Gravit, 268 U. S. 161 (1925) ; Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189 (1920).
32 See footnote 30.
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every day usage."3 It is highly problematical that the ordinary
layman would considered the gains realized from "insider's
profits or from the recovery of a judgment for treble damages
other than "income."
If the soundness of the Supreme Court decisions be tested from
a jurisprudential point of view, the discussion by the Court of
Appeals in Commissioner v. Obear-Nester Glass Co. 4 in regard
to taxation according to ability to pay is of interest. As stated by
the court:
We do not believe that the Supreme Court intended to define income
exclusively according to its source. The great argument which resulted
in this country's adoption of an income tax, and the fundamental princi-
ple upon which that tax is still based, is that individuals will be taxed
according to their ability to pay. There is no rational connection between
the source of the taxpayer's gain and his ability to pay. The question is:
has he realized an economic gain, from whatever source, which leaves
him better able to contribute to the support of this government.... If
gain not derived from capital or labor is excluded from taxation, the
burden on income that is derived from these sources, will of course, be
all the greater.35
Undoubtedly, an individual's ability to pay is enhanced by the
recovery of punitive damages. If the "ability to pay" concept is still
to be professed to be one of the underlying bases for the present tax
structure, it may likewise serve as a jurisprudential justification
for the taxation of punitive damages.
Questions Raised by the Decisions
Previously, it was stated that several questions were raised as
a result of the decisions. Since the Supreme Court has opened the
way for a case by case consideration of what may come within
the term "taxable income," an academic question might arise as
to whether the courts will move closer to the economic concept
of income. For example, one economist defined income as ".... the
money value of the net accretion to economic power between two
33 Brown Shoe Co. v. Commissioner, 133 F. 2d 582 (8th Cir. 1943) ; Helvering v.
Edison Bros. Stores, Inc., 133 F. 2d 575 (8th Cir. 1943) ; U. S. v. Oregon-Washington
R. R. & Nav. Co., 251 Fed. 211 (2nd Cir. 1918).
84 217 F. 2d 56 (7th Cir. 1954).
3 217 F. 2d 56, 61.
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points of time.""6 The distinction between such a definition of
income and the general rule as to what constitutes taxable income
is that in the former there is no requirement that the accretion be
realized. The normal requirement of realization is an adminis-
trative limitation imposed for the sake of expediency in the ad-
ministration of the taxing statutes.37 It is very doubtful that it
would be possible to administer in this country a statute which
required an exact evaluation of every taxpayer's assets at the
beginning and end of each taxable period with the imposition of
a tax on the difference thus disclosed." However, the language of
the Supreme Court in the Glenshaw case should dispel any fears
that the courts will drift toward a system of taxation without the
requirement of realization as a result of their recent decisions.
In the Glenshaw case, the Court stated: "Here we have instances
of undeniable accession to wealth, clearly realized, and over which
the taxpayer's have complete dominion." 9
In regard to the Federal Anti-Trust laws, the Supreme Court
decision that punitive damages are taxable income should not
be criticized as diminishing the benefits given to the individual
bringing the anti-trust action. The primary purpose of the anti-
trust laws is to protect the public, the private remedy being merely
incidental 4 The right granted to individual suitors to seek repa-
ration is secondary and subordinate in purpose.4" However, in
view of the fact that the provision for treble damages was designed
to supply an ancillary force of private investigators to supplement
the Department of Justice in law enforcement,42 the effect of mak-
ing the recoveries taxable should cause concern. Will the lessen-
ing of the net benefits to be gained from the successful prosecu-
3s HAIG, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX (Columbia University Lectures, 1920) p. 27.
37 MAGILL, TAXABLE INCOME 21-24.
38 MAGILL, Op. cit supra note 37.
39 99 L. Ed. 361, 365 (Advance Sheet No. 9).
40 Wildir Mfg. Co. v. Corn Products Rfg. Co., 236 U. S. 165 (1914); Glenn Coal Co.
v. Dickenson Fuel Co. 72 F. 2d 885 (4th Cir. 1934); Louisiana Farmer's Protective
Union v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 40 F. Supp. 897 (D. C. Ark. 1941), rev'd.
131 F. 2d 419 (8th Cir. 1942) ; 6 TOULMIN, ANTI-TRUST LAWS, § 16.4 (1951).
41 Fedderson Motors v. Ward, 180 F. 2d 519, 521 (10th Cir. 1950) ; Glenn Coal Co. v.
Dickenson Fuel Co. 72 F. 2d 885 (4th Cir. 1934).
42 Weinberg v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 48 F. Supp. 203 (D. C. N. Y. 1942); Quemos
Theatre Co., Inc. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 949 (D. C. N. J. 1940) ; 6
TOULMIN, ANTI-TRUST LAWS, § 16.4.
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tion of an anti-trust suit have the effect of reducing the number
of suits brought? The answer would seem to depend on many
differing factors; e.g., is the complainant an individual or a cor-
poration? In what tax bracket is he, if an individual? Depending
on the circumstances, it might well be that a portion or all of the
actual damages recovered are nontaxable; and, when coupled with
the amount of punitive damages the injured party still retains
after taxes are paid, such sum may remain an effective incentive
to bring the action.
However, if the increased tax burden does act as deterring fea-
ture, it should be noted that the burden is increased due to the
fact that a large amount of income will be grouped into one tax
period. If the grouping of income could be avoided, the tax bur-
den would be lessened; and correspondingly the deterrent effect
of such a tax burden would be lessened. Because of the nature of
the recovery it does not appeaer that an individual or a partner-
ship could utilize the spreading provisions of section 1301, relat-
ing to compensation received for services rendered over thirty-
six months or more, or 1302, relating to income from an invention
or artistic work.43 However, aside from other considerations which
might make it undesirable to do so, a careful wording of the judg-
ment so as to make the amount of the judgment recoverable over
a specified number of years could accomplish a tax-leveling and
saving.44
Conclusion
In legal theory the Supreme Court decisions are upon a firm
and reasonable basis. Possibly the decisions will have adverse
effects on the administration of the anti-trust laws; but, for such
an isolated instance as is presented in that type case, the proper
43 INT. REV. CODE § § 1301 and 1302. Under similar provisions in the 1939 Code, the
amount received as proceeds from compromised litigation for infringement of a copy-
right was not considered to constitute compensation for personal services. Jack Rosen-
zweig, et al., 1 T. C. 24 (1942).
44 Tax benefits are often gained by careful wording of divorce decrees for example.
1 MFaTENs, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, § 5.23. Such a course of action would
probably accomplish its purpose in regard to cash basis taxpayers, but accrual basis tax-




remedy would seem to lie in an exemption or relief provision to
the code.45 In relation to the general field of taxable income, the
decisions are a judicial step forward in freeing the courts from
the judicial straight-jacket of Eisner v. Macomber.
Ernest E. Specks.
4s Such a provision could take the form of a complete exemption, or provide that
recoveries will be given capital gains treatment, or provide for a spreading back or
forward with limitations on the total amounts of taxes to be paid attributable to the
recovery.
[Vol. 9
